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Background: The World Health Organization proposes 6 building blocks for health systems. These are vulnerable to
challenges in many contexts. Findings from a 2004 assessment of the health system in Mali for diabetes care found
many barriers were present for the management and care of this condition. Following this assessment different
projects to strengthen the healthcare system for people living with diabetes were undertaken by a local NGO,
Santé Diabète.
Case description: In March 2012, following a Coup in Bamako, the northern part of Mali was occupied and cut-off
from the rest of the country. This had a major impact on the health system throughout the country. Due to the lack
of response by humanitarian actors, Santé Diabète in close collaboration with other local stakeholders developed
a humanitarian response for patients with diabetes. This response included evacuation of children with Type 1
diabetes from northern regions to Bamako; supplies of medicines and tools for management of diabetes; and
support to people with diabetes who moved from the north to the south of the country.
Discussion: It has been argued that diabetes is a good tracer for health systems and based on Santé Diabète’s
experience in Mali, diabetes could also be used as a tracer in the context of emergencies. One lesson from this
experience is that although people with diabetes should be included as a vulnerable part of the population they
are not considered as such. Also within a complex emergency different “diabetes populations” may exist with
different needs requiring tailored responses, such as internally displaced people versus those still in conflict areas.
From Santé Diabète’s perspective, the challenge was changing the ways it operated from a development NGO to
an emergency NGO. In this role it could rely on its knowledge of the local situation and its function as part of the
post-conflict situation.
Conclusion: The lessons learnt from this experience by Santé Diabète in Mali may be useful for other NGOs and
the humanitarian response in general in addressing the challenge of managing non communicable diseases and
diabetes in conflict and disaster situations in countries with weak health systems.Background
The World Health Organization (WHO) states that the
health system is comprised of all the “activities whose
primary purpose is to promote, restore and maintain
health” [1]. Health systems are intimately linked to the
other socio-political elements in a given country and
therefore different models of health systems exist [2].
However, each health system can be described based on
the six key functions they must deliver [2]: (1) Service
delivery; (2) Healthcare workforce; (3) Information; (4)* Correspondence: stephane.besancon@santediabete.org
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unless otherwise stated.Medical products, vaccines and technologies; (5) Finan-
cing; and (6) Leadership and governance.
In caring for people with diabetes the health system
needs to prevent complications in addition to any other
negative physical and psychosocial impacts of this condi-
tion [3,4]. However, health systems in Low Income
Countries (LIC) have been found to be weak at deliver-
ing the services that their populations need as they are
not tailored to care for people with chronic diseases
[5,6]. Failings in one or many of these 6 elements can be
the cause of this. Based on this, a Rapid Assessment
Protocol (RAP) to assess the barriers to diabetes care
in LICs was developed by the International Insulinral. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
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of health systems and access to diabetes care) with the
aim to assess the barriers to access to diabetes care and
medicines [7]. This approach allows for an overall vision
of the 6 elements of the health system and where these
may fail in delivering appropriate diabetes care.
In 2004 the IIF in partnership with Santé Diabète
(French NGO active in Francophone West Africa in the
area of diabetes) carried out this RAP in Mali. Mali was
chosen for this study as like many other countries in
sub-Saharan Africa it faced an increasing burden of
diabetes due to increases in urbanization, the challenges
of the nutritional transition and increasing sedentary be-
havior. The Malian health system is also confronted by
many challenges with regards to the 6 WHO building
blocks and it was of interest to the IIF, Santé Diabète
and the Malian Ministry of Health to see how these im-
pacted the management of diabetes. Finally having Santé
Diabète active in Mali and collaborating closely with
local stakeholders and institutions meant that the rec-
ommendations from the RAP could be implemented.
Mali is located in West Africa with a population of
14.8 million people and a life expectancy at birth of
57 years for men and women [8]. Total expenditure on
health per capita per year is Int.$ 74 representing 5.8%
of total Gross Domestic Product. It is estimated that
31% of total deaths are due to Noncommunicable dis-
eases (NCD), with 2% due to diabetes [8]. The Inter-
national Diabetes Federation (IDF) estimates the
prevalence of diabetes in Mali at 1.28% of the adult
population [9], but local experts would state that this
seriously underestimates the true burden. The preva-
lence of Type 2 diabetes in the African Region is esti-
mated to be 4.9% (20–79-year olds) [10].
The findings from the 2004 study found many barriers
with regards to the 6 building blocks of the health system.
For example, in terms of service delivery, there were no
guidelines or treatment protocols, no organization and
coordination of care and referrals, sub-optimal use of the
existing health pyramid in Mali, long waiting times and a
lack of patient education [11]. An absence of care outside
of Bamako (the capital city) meant that many people from
all of Mali had to travel to Bamako for care. Specialists
were only present in Bamako and there was a clear lack of
human resources in terms of overall number and training.
At the time of the assessment there were only 2 specialists
(one diabetologist and one endocrinologist) practicing in
all of Mali. In terms of data and information there was no
standardized means of collecting information on patients
and there was an overall lack of data on the number of
people with diabetes in Mali. Serious problems were
present in terms of the availability and affordability of
medicines and other supplies. Insulin was not widely avail-
able and cost approximately US$ 11 per vial. Syringes anddiagnostic tests were also not readily available and posed a
financial burden to those who needed to access them. Is-
sues with the supply chain for both medicines and labora-
tory equipment were identified. The patient and their
family had to bear the entirety of the financial burden of
diabetes as no government or other support was available.
Leadership and governance were lacking with no govern-
ment policy or strategy addressing diabetes and no
organizational structure at a national level coordinating
the government’s response to diabetes or NCDs.
This resulted in the life expectancy of a child with Type
1 diabetes being 1 year after diagnosis, in comparison
to normal life expectancy in the “Western world”. On
average per month a patient in Bamako spent $21.24 on
diabetes care (assuming 1 blood glucose measurement per
month, 8 syringes per month, 1 vial of insulin at an aver-
age cost of $10.88 in the public sector, 1 monthly consult-
ation, and travel costs) representing nearly 70% of per
capita GDP [12]. In contrast in Mozambique and Zambia
other countries in sub-Saharan Africa where this research
was carried out monthly costs were equivalent to US$
22.8 and US$ 16.59 respectively [13].
These results were then used by Santé Diabète, in col-
laboration with the Ministry of Health, local specialists
and the WHO Country Office to develop a comprehen-
sive strategy to address the barriers highlighted above.
The overall project included training of diabetes “refer-
ral” doctors throughout the country, training for other
health professionals in the area of diabetes and the
creation of specialized university diplomas in the area of
diabetes. In addition improvements were made with the
availability of diagnostic tools and decreasing the price of
medicines. Diabetes registers were created, as were different
elements to improve service delivery such as development
of specialized and decentralized diabetes consultations,
strengthening of patient education and targeting specific
complications. These projects were destabilized due to the
crisis that started in Mali in March 2012.
Case description
On the 22nd of March 2012, Mali was shaken by a coup
carried out by part of the Malian armed forces [14]. In
the beginning of April 2012 the main towns of the north
of Mali, Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu were overtaken by
Touareg rebels seeking independence from Bamako [15].
In July the same year Islamists took control of the whole
of northern Mali and in January 2013 these forces
launched an offensive to take over the south [16,17].
The French government intervened militarily in its
former colony to stop the progression of these militants.
This destabilization of the country, its government and
health system impacted the 6 building blocks of the
health system. In the north of Mali this had a direct im-
pact whereas in the south the impact was more indirect
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weak health system as they fled the conflict zone. The
impact of this situation on the 6 building blocks of the
WHO in terms of diabetes in the two areas of Mali is
summarized in Table 1. Because of this people with
diabetes faced a whole series of challenges in terms of
access to care and medicines [18].
As of April 2012 a massive humanitarian response was
organized to help the 2.24 million people living in areas
directly impacted by the conflict and 198,500 displaced
people [19,20]. To address this situation two parallel re-
sponses were developed, one by the Ministry of Health’s
technical staff and the other developed by humanitarian
actors. Both of these were then combined into a Com-
mon Humanitarian Action Plan. The overall resources
allocated to this crisis were US$ 150 million for the
overall humanitarian response and US$ 9.5 million
specifically for health [19,20].
In asking for support for people with diabetes Santé
Diabète received many negative responses from traditional
donors. For example the Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and United NationsTable 1 Impact of conflict on the health system in the north a
WHO Health System Building Block North of Mali
Service delivery • Limited services provid
• Only 7.9% of health fac
providing diabetes servi
• Services provided by U
or NGOs versus Malian h
• 65% of health facilities
not functional
Healthcare workforce • Flight from conflict zon
• Limited number of NG
resident health workers
limited services
Information • Lack of accurate and c
health information
• Malaria and measles ep
detected by NGOs
Medical products, vaccines and technologies • Complete interruption
• Destruction of existing
Financing • Role of United Nations
versus government
• Limited partners suppo
health financing in Timb
Leadership and governance • Absence of local Malian
authority in north of couChildren's Fund (UNICEF) declined to support diabetes
related activities despite the small amount requested, US$
41,000 from OCHA and US$ 12,700 from UNICEF. The
response from OCHA was “diabetes is not in the frame-
work and not a emergency” and UNICEF stated “Diabetes
is not a priority” [21]. It was not the actual proposals de-
veloped by Santé Diabète that were rejected, but the popu-
lation in critical need of diabetes services not seen as a
priority by those responding to the crisis. The reason for
this is that people with NCDs and diabetes were not in-
cluded in the “priority list”, as they were not considered as
vulnerable. Diabetes should be seen as a priority as people
with this condition are vulnerable even in normal circum-
stances, a fact being exacerbated during a period of crisis.
Santé Diabète decided to propose an emergency strategy
for people with diabetes building off its knowledge and
experience as a development NGO active in Mali since
2001. This strategy focused on two target populations:
1. People with diabetes living in the north who were
still in that area
2. Internally displaced people with diabetesnd south of Mali [18]
South of Mali
ed by NGOs • Extra burden on existing services due to
the number of internally displaced population
ilities were
ces




e • Insufficient health workers to accommodate
the massive internal displacement (more than
300,000 internally displaced persons mainly to
the region of Mopti)
Os and local
providing
redible • Lack of capacity to collect regular data in
addition to supplementary data to manage crisis
idemics
of supplies • Lack of supplies at facilities for the people
with diabetes already being managed
infrastructure
• Additional burden further strained existing
limited resources
and NGOs • Health services partly financed by government
and bilateral and multilateral donors, UN agencies
and NGOs
• The population in the south received no
additional support and due to the influx of people
from the north and crisis situation actually received
less support than prior to the crisis




• Instability of the transitional government
• Lack of leadership for policy issues
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to Malian refugees with diabetes in neighboring coun-
tries and initiated discussions with the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). However,
due to limited resources Santé Diabète was unable to
respond to the needs of this group.
Given this lack of response from major donors as well
as actors on the ground, Santé Diabète was still able to
find funding from different sources. The partners who
responded positively were the French Crisis Center and
the French Development Agency, the Rhône Alpes
region in France and private donations. In addition the
private sector contributed some medicines. With the
technical support of the WHO Country Office the dia-
betes emergency response was launched in partnership
with the Ministry of Health, the Department of Endo-
crinology and Diabetology of the “Hôpital du Mali” and
the National Federation of Malian Diabetics.
Because of the technical and financial constraints,
Santé Diabète decided to focus on 4 of the 6 health sys-
tem blocks. The first and fundamental block was access
to medicines. Santé Diabète was able to supply essential
diabetes medicines and insulin to the north of the coun-
try by using diabetes patient associations, health profes-
sionals and humanitarian NGOs active in the north of
the country. Santé Diabète supported 1,814 people in
the north of Mali with medicines. Testing equipment
was also supplied to areas where this equipment had
been destroyed or was no longer available, and Santé Di-
abète created and supplied different kits for the manage-
ment of diabetic comas and diabetic foot complications
(See Table 2). Malian specialists created these kits and
Santé Diabète provided the logistical support for this.
These kits were then supplied to those in need via
local authorities from Timbuktu, humanitarian NGOs
and diabetes associations. The emergency kits prepared
by Santé Diabète enabled to care of 32 people withTable 2 Specialized diabetes kits developed by Santé Diabète
Tools included in specialized diabetes kits and average quantities need
Foot kit
Antibiotic Quantity of each one fo
3 families (Fluoroquinolone; Macrolides,
lincosamides and streptogramines; Beta-lactam)
Metronidazole 21 bottles 100 ml
Dakin’s solution 1 bottle of 250 ml
Compresses (40*40 cm) 2 boxes of 10
Bandages 10 x 4.5 cm B/12 1 box of 12diabetic foot complications and 15 people in diabetic
coma. These actors also assisted in data collection with a
simple data collection sheet developed by Santé Diabète.
This was used to assess the needs for the kits and medi-
cines as well as identify people requiring support. Using
this information helped Santé Diabète identify patients
from the north who had moved to the south. The “ser-
vice delivery” element was also seen as important and
Santé Diabète provided technical support to humanitar-
ian NGOs active in the north of Mali and health profes-
sionals still in these regions via telephone support with
specialists at the “Hôpital du Mali” for complex cases.
Service delivery was also reinforced in the south of the
country where there was a large influx of displaced people.
One particular element of service delivery that was ad-
dressed was the evacuation of children with Type 1 dia-
betes from the north of Mali to Bamako. Due to the
complexity of the management of this condition known
children with this condition were brought to Bamako as
soon as the crisis started. Santé Diabète also supplied ma-
terials and medicines to facilities in the south to help them
cope with the increased patient load. Although different
NGOs and the International Organization for Migration
(IOM) had within their remit to care for internally dis-
placed people they asked Santé Diabète to manage people
with diabetes. Santé Diabète was therefore responsible
for the care and medicines of 150 people with diabetes.
Finally one can argue that although limited, Santé Diabète
through its activities was able to contribute to the “Finan-
cing” element of the emergency response. Santé Diabète’s
response is summarized in Table 3.
The health system elements of workforce and leader-
ship and governance were not addressed. Santé Diabète
neither had the resources nor considered as its mandate
to provide medical personnel specifically dedicated to
diabetes. However, as described in the response, support
to services were provided through other organizationsed per patient
Diabetic coma
r 7 days per patient Insulin syringes U-100 1 box of 100
Rapid acting insulin 1 vial of 10 ml
Blood Glucose Meter 1
Glucose strips 1 box of 50
Urine test strips 1 box of 50
Lactated Ringer’s solution 20 bottles 500 ml
Saline solution 15 bottles 500 ml
Urinary catheter 2
Urinary catheter bag 2
Gastric catheter 2
Quinine 12 vials of 400 mg
Table 3 Santé Diabète’s response to the crisis using the
WHO’s 6 building blocks
WHO Health System Building Block Santé Diabète’s response
Service delivery • Support to other NGOs and
doctors active in the north
of Mali
• Support to facilities in the south
to cope with additional burden
• Transporting children to Bamako
Information • Development of simple tools
to collect information on
people with diabetes
• Use of existing networks for




• Development of special kits
Financing • Covering all costs for those in
need within its limited means
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OCHA, UNICEF, WHO and IOM should be considered
as an attempt to respond to the needs of people with
diabetes from a service delivery rather than a leadership
and governance perspective.”
Discussion
As diabetes is considered a good tracer for health
systems [5,22,23], this case study might provide useful
insight into the humanitarian response for NCDs and
diabetes. The lessons learnt from Santé Diabète’s experi-
ence in managing diabetes in an emergency context are
relevant to the different elements of the 6 building
blocks. Although these building blocks are usually uti-
lized for stable health systems they remain relevant in
times of emergency as people still need to access health
care provided by a system be it delivered by local facil-
ities, NGOs or a UN agency.
This case study highlights the lack of leadership and
governance in including NCDs and diabetes on the agenda
of humanitarian actors. In September 2011 the United
Nations held a Summit on NCDs, its second health-related
summit after its 2001 meeting on HIV/AIDS. Despite being
the main cause of mortality worldwide with 63% of total
deaths [24], NCDs have not been firmly placed on the
development agenda [25,26]. Although often thought of
as “diseases of the rich” close to 80% of NCD deaths
occur in Low and Middle-Income Countries. Following
this the WHO has developed a Global Action Plan for
NCDs that include the following statements regarding
NCDs and the humanitarian response [27]:
– “It must be ensured that the use of these services
does not expose the users to financial hardship,including in cases of ensuring the continuity of care
in the aftermath of emergencies and disasters.”
– “Improve the availability of life-saving technologies
and essential medicines for managing NCDs in the
initial phase of emergency response.”
Despite clear recommendations from the WHO,
prioritizing these diseases both on global level and also
specifically for emergencies, other UN organizations and
humanitarian actors have not followed this guidance. As
highlighted by Demaio et al. [28] NCDs have not re-
ceived the attention necessary in emergency contexts. In
Mali the WHO in its role of coordinator of the health
cluster was the only international actor trying to address
the NCD issue. This was reinforced by a change of lead-
ership in WHO in Mali which allowed awareness to be
raised about the need to take NCDs into account among
the priority health issues during the Malian crisis.
With regards to information, medical products, service
delivery, human resources and financing Spiegel et al.
[29] provide guidance in terms of what should be done
in humanitarian crises. This includes registration of
people with chronic conditions that can be cared for lo-
cally, including diabetes and cardiovascular disease. As
done by Santé Diabète, Spiegel et al. [29] propose the
creation of treatment kits for health facilities as well as
simplified care guidelines for the use at home. Regarding
human resources the recommendation is that chronic
disease care should be included in the training of hu-
manitarian workers. Finally, the issue of cost of manage-
ment of diabetes and NCDs and how the humanitarian
response needs to adequately plan for this.
This case study also raises the issue of vulnerability.
Vulnerable populations are more prone to face the ad-
verse effects of a humanitarian crisis [30] and people
with diabetes clearly fit into this category. This specific
population can be seen as vulnerable due to their con-
tinuous need for health care and medicines and the fi-
nancial burden this may place on them. Type 1 diabetes
affects children, already a category of vulnerability on its
own. The needs of people with diabetes are already com-
plex and the added strain of a crisis situation means that
this sub-population, as all populations with chronic
diseases, need special attention [31].
In an emergency setting there is also not one single
“diabetes population”, but several each with specific
needs. These sub-populations included people still in
the conflict area, internally displaced people, refugees
and also the population in the south of Mali. All these
populations contain individuals with diabetes, but the
response to each set of needs may be very different.
For Malian refugees these were people who may have
lost everything and had to flee their homes for neighbor-
ing countries, versus people internally displaced having
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and friends in Bamako and still being in their country.
In the north the health system was completely destroyed,
versus in the south due to the crisis the health system
became overburdened. All these sub-populations need
to be addressed in different ways with a variety of
actors involved.
Santé Diabète in its response to 3 out of 4 of these
populations had to shift its focus from being a develop-
ment NGO to managing development projects in a hu-
manitarian crisis as well as developing a response to the
emergency situation in Mali. Its response could rely on
its vast knowledge and experience of the Malian context
and links with local partners to address challenges it
faced on the ground. Long-term experience of a country
is something that traditional humanitarian organizations
do not have due to their modus operandi and short-term
focus in a given setting. In addition, having carried out a
situation analysis of the health system in 2004 allowed
Santé Diabète an in-depth knowledge of the Malian
health system. It has been proposed that humanitarian
organizations in their assessment of needs and response
include NCDs [30]. Santé Diabète through its existing
projects and partnerships is also actively involved in the
post-emergency reconstruction of the health system. By
intervening in the crisis situation it has guaranteed con-
tinuity of care with regards to medicines, service deliv-
ery, information and financing.Conclusion
The lessons from this case study may be applicable to
other LICs where frequent humanitarian emergencies
place strain on already weak health systems. These health
systems do not provide appropriate management for NCDs
including diabetes meaning that in a time of humanitarian
emergencies this already vulnerable population faces
additional challenges. The lack of priority given to this
group of individuals in humanitarian emergencies needs
to be addressed as well as how the response for chronic
conditions needs to build on existing local expertise to
benefit the emergency response, but also plan for the
post-emergency reconstruction.Competing interests
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